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RESTRICTING DISCLAIMER OF THE WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY IN CONSUMER SALES:
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE UCC
In response to the widespread support for the abolition of the re-
quirement of privity of contract in suits for breach of warranty,1
the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code offered alternatives A,
B and C to section 2-318.2 The primary motivation for the promulga-
tion of these alternatives was the judicial recoguition in at least twenty
jurisdictions of the doctrine of strict liability in tort,' which was
thought to be in conflict with the adoption of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and its intended purpose of pre-emption of the law of sales.
To avoid this apparent court-legislature conflict in states which recog-
nized the doctrine of strict liability in tort and to discourage other
jurisdictions from adopting the tort theory, the alternatives were offered
with the hope of regaining or preserving the unifornuty intended by
the Code.
There remains, however, one alluring aspect of the doctrine of strict
tort liability which has not been incorporated into the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, and its onussion is likely to cause future problems; the
Code recognizes disclaimers of warranty whereas strict liability in tort
will not. Section 2-316 of the Code allows the seller to disclaim the
implied warranty of merchantability by the use of appropriate lan-
1. See 2 L. FRuMER & M. FREDMAN, PRODUCrS LLumury § 16.04[2] [b] (1966) for a
state by state analysis.
2. REPORT No. 3 OF IHE PIEMANENT EDtrroRiAL BOARD FOR THE UNiFoRo CoMERtciAL
CoDE 13 (1967) [hereinafter cited as UCC REPORT No. 3].
3. See 1 CCH PROD. Lt~z. REP. 4060 (1968). After California abolished the privity
requirement by adopting a theory of strict liability in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), the theory was codified in
the REsrATEmENT (SEco-D) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965), which states:
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm.thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition m which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
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guage;4 however, the tort theory gives no effect to such disclaimers
because tort law does not recognize contractual devices.5 Thus, the
Code and the strict liability in tort doctrine continue to differ on this
important point.
The Code, as previously noted, offered "optional" amendments to
section 2-318 to allow the states to adopt new privity requirements by
statute instead of by judicial fiat." Why not promulgate in the same
manner, either "official" or "optional" amendments to sections 2-314,
2-316, and 2-719 and bring the Code in line with recent developments
reached under strict liability in tort?7 Specifically, the drafters of the
Code should reassess their position with respect to the disclaimer of
the warranty of merchantability in the sale of new consumer goods by
a merchant. Presently, no distinction between consumer and commer-
cial buyer is made in section 2-316,8 but due to differences in bargain-
ing power and product sophistication, some distinction is necessary.
The purpose of this note is to inquire into the desirability of dis-
claimers of warranty, particularly with reference to consumer sales, and
to formulate alternatives to sections 2-314, 2-316 and 2-719, in a man-
ner similar to those formulated for 2-318, as a suggested course the
drafters may follow in offering protection for the consumer comparable
to that offered under strict liability in tort.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Purchasers of certain goods in the Roman Empire were protected
4. UNwo m COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
5. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MiNN. L. REv. 791, 831 (1966). See also 2 L. FRutMER & M. FRMDMAN, PROD-
uars LiABmrry § 16A[51[3) (1966).
6. See UCC REPORT No. 3, supra note 2.
7. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communications
Barriers, 17 W. REP. L. REv. 5, 43-45, suggests that the disclaimer of the implied
warranty of merchantability may be prima facie unconscionable. Other recent pro-
posals to rectify the situation include federal legislation, Note, A Federal Consuemer
Products Liability Act, 7 HA~v. J. LEcIs. 568 (1970), extending section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to include "economic loss." See Note, Consumer Pro-
tection and Warranties of Quality: A Proposal for a Statutory Warranty in Sales to
Consumers, 34 ALBaNY L. REv. 339 (1970) for a proposed Uniform Consumer Warranty
Act.
8. UNxsoR COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
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by specific warranties arising from a sale.9 The early guild regulations
in England extended protection to buyers of certain goods,'0 but by the
17th century the guild regulations had become ineffective and were
replaced by caveat emptor.11 The expression "caveat emptor" developed
from an inaccurate quotation of the statute of Westminster 1112 in Moore
v. Hussey'3 and was repeated in subsequent cases, the most famous being
Chandler v. Lopus-.14 In America caveat emptor, supported by strong
notions of freedom of contract, became an absolute doctrine of sales
law.Y0
However, in 1815, in the case of Gardiner v. Gray,16 Lord Ellen-
borough recognized an implied warranty of merchantability in the
sale of goods which the buyer had not inspected:
I am of the opinion, however, that under such circumstances, the
purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering the de-
scription in the contract. Without any particular warranty this is
an implied term in every such contract. When there is no oppor-
tunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of caveat emptor does
not apply. He cannot without a warranty insist that it shall be of
any particular quality or fineness, but the intention of both parties
must be taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the market under
the denomination mentioned in the contract between them. The
purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a
dunghill.17
As Lord Elenborough stated, to be merchantable, goods had to con-
form to the description in the contract. This requirement was refined
by subsequent cases' and was eventually formalized in the English
9. See generally BucKrLaND, A Taxi-Boon OF ROMAN LAW 488-91 (1921).
10. See Kessler, The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, Part I,
A Comparative Study, 74 YALE L.J. 262, 266 (1964). See also Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YAUS L.J. 1133, 1141-56 (1931) for an extensive treatment of
the development of the local, guild and national regulation scheme in early England.
11. See Kessler, supra note 10, at 263-64.
12. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1165-66.
13. 80 Eng. Rep. 243 (K.B. 1601).
14. 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (K.B. 1603). See Hamilton, supra note 10. at 1166-67.
15. E.g., Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N.Y. 552 (1860); McFarlund v. Newman, 9 Watts 55,
34 Am. Dec. 497 (Pa. 1839).
16. 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (KJB. 1815).
17. Id. at 47.
18. E.g., Jones v. Just, [1868] 3 Q. B. 197.
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Sale of Goods Act19 and the Uniform Sales Act. 0 Both the Sale of Goods,
Act and the Uniform Sales Act designated the warranty arising from
the description in the contract of sale as an implied warranty, but sec4
don 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code designates the warranty.
arising from the contract description as an express warranty.21
In stating that "the purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay
them on a dunghill," 2 Lord Ellenborough recognized the fundamental
concept of merchantability as it exists today under the Code: that goods
in order to be merchantable must be fit for the ordinary use for which!
such goods are purchased. 23 Thus, when a dealer sells an automobile, the
buyer reasonably expects that it will be fit for driving, and if for some
reason it fails to perform the automobile is not merchantable. The
common law implied warranty of merchantability arose only from a
sale by a merchant,2 4 and this requirement is continued by the Uniform
Commercial Code.25 The justification for a distinction between a sale
by a merchant and a sale by a non-merchant rests on the fact that a
buyer cannot reasonably expect to receive merchantable goods from a
seller not in that business.2 6
DIsGLAmiERs AND FPEEDOM OF CONTRACT
The imposition of warranties of quality on "merchants" was an ob-
19. ENGLISH SALE OF GOODS Acr, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 13.
Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an
implied condition that the goods shall correspond with the description; and
if the sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is not sufficient that
the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also
correspond with the description.
20. Uwosm SALEs Acr § 14:
Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by description, there is
an implied warranty that the goods shall correspond with the description and
if the contract or sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is not
sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample if the
goods do not also correspond with the description.
See also id. § 15 (2): "Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals
in goods of that description (whether he be a grower or manufacturer or not), there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality" See also
ExGusH SALE oF GooDs AcT, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 14(2).
21. UN ROm COMMm-cAL CODE § 313(1) (b).
22. Gardner v. Gray, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (K.B. 1815).
23. UNwForm COMMRCAL CODE § 2-314(2) (c).
24. See ENLasI SAm oF GooDs Aar, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, §§ 13, 15(2); UN FORM
SALEs Acr §§ 14, 15(2).
25. UNnmoRm CoMmRcLtr CODE § 2-314(1).
26. See, e.g., Zielinsld v. Potter, 195 Mich. 90, 161 N.W. 851 (1917).
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vious burden on sellers of unmerchantable goods. As a result, sellers
attempted to extricate themselves from warranty liability by including
language in the contract of sale which presumably constituted notice
to the buyer that his seller was not willing to make certain promises
regarding the quality of the goods This attempt to disclaim warranty
liability was required to be included in the contract at the time of
execution. -s
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, disclaimers
took many forms. Agreements which contained stipulations that the
buyer takes the goods "as is" 29 or "with all faults" 30 were commonly
interpreted as relieving the seller of all warranty obligations. Often
the seller would exclude all express and implied warranties arising from
the sale, give his own express warranty and then limit damages to
replacement of parts.3' Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act permitted
the disclaimer of "any right, duty or liability arising under a contract
to sell or a sale by implication of law.., by express agreement or by
the course of dealings between the parties to the contract. .. ." n The
drafters of the 1941 Revised Uniform Sales Act attempted to limit sec-
tion 71 by providing that implied warranties could not be disclaimed
"if the circumstances indicate that a reasonable person in the position
of the buyer would, despite such general language, be in fact relying
on the merchantable quality of the goods." 3 3 Unfortunately, this limi-
tation was never enacted into law.
At present, disclaimers of implied warranties are controlled by sec-
tion 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code. This section allows the
exclusion of implied warranties only by the use of explicit language in
the contract of sale. In the case of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability, the word "merchantability" must be mentioned.3 4 The ex-
27. E.g., Baglehole v. Walters, 170 Eng. Rep. 1338 (K.B. 1811) ("with all faults").
28. E.g., Ward v. Valker, 44 N.D. 598, 176 N.W. 129 (1920).
29. E.g., Union Trust Co. v. Detroit River Transit Co., 162 Mich. 670, 127 N.W.
780 (1910).
30. See note 27 supra. See also Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MInN. L. Rv. 117,158 (1943).
31. E.g., Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559, 209 N.W.
996 (1926),
32. UxNoma SALES Acr § 71. See generally Note, Sales-Warranties-Contractual
Disclaimers of Warranty, 23 MIN. L. REv. 784 (1939).
33. REvIsED UMFORM SALES Acr § 15(6) (2d draft 1941). Prosser states that "[r]his
seems to be an excellent statement of a desirable rule." Prosser, supra note 30, at 165.
34. UNwORM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 2-316(2). But see id. § 2-316(3). ,
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clusion may be oral or written, but if written, the dislaimer clause must
be conspicuous. 3 5 If the clause satisfies the 2-316 requirements, it con-
stitutes a valid disclaimer under the Code and is presumably enforce-
able.86
Freedom of contract, the doctrinal basis for disclaimers of warranty,
developed from the general philosophy of individual freedom of the
18th century. This concept was later influenced by the theories of
laissez-faire economics.3 Gradually, "freedom of contract" became
the fundamental maxim of contract law:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their con-
tracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred
and shall be enforced by Courts of justice. 38
This "natural right" to contract without judicial or governmental
supervision was early recognized in both state " and federal courts. °
However, state and federal legislators were quick to realize that the
assumptions upon which freedom of contract were based were not
supported by the realities of the human condition.41 Gradually, free-
dom of contract has been restricted where one party has attempted to
take advantage of his superior bargaining position to the detriment of
35. Id. § 2-316(2).
36. There is disagreement as to whether or not a valid 2-316 disclaimer clause is
subject to judicial scrutiny by use of section 2-302 dealing with unconscionable con-
tracts. See generally Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 523 (1967). But see Willman v. American Motor Sales
Co. & Chrysler Corp, 44 Erie Leg. J. 51, 1 UCC REt. SEav. 100 (Erie County Ct. C. P.,
Pa. 1961), where the court in dictum stated that section 2-302 applied to an "unconscion-
able" 2-316 disclaimer. See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 59 Misc.
2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The Walsh case was cited as holding the 2-316 disclaimer
prima facie unconscionable in Shwartz, A Products Liability Primer, 33 Am. TRIAl
LAwYE's L.J. 64, 92 (1970). Contra, Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability,
31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 72 n.218 (1969). Although the case is not clear, the court seems to
be using the prima facie unconscionable phrase to void the limitation and exclusion of
damages under section 2-719(3) and not the disclaimer itself.
37. See Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L. J. 454, 456 (1909); Williston, Free-
dom of Contract, 6 CoaUmLL L. Q. 365, 366 (1921).
38. Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L. R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
39. E.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887).
40. See Pound, supra note 37, at 479-81.
41. Id.
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the other party.42 Where consumers are involved, the courts now
realize that while freedom of contract supports many agreements in
form, it supports very few in fact; and for this reason, the courts are
beginning to examine the actual bargaining process in determining the
enforceability of a contract.43
PRESENT STATUS OF THE DISCLAIMER
At present, forty-nine jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and its attendant provisions providing for the existence
and exclusion of warranties and for the limitation or exclusion of rem-
edies for breach of those warranties.4 In addition to the Code's statutory
scheme, as noted previously, approximately twenty states have judicially
adopted strict liability in tort45 which operates independently of the
Code.46 Because Article 2 of the Code contains explicit warranty pro-
visions and presumably applies to all contracts for the sale of goods,
it is difficult to reconcile the superimposition by the judiciary of strict
liability in tort with the legislative intent as expressed in the adoption
of Article 2 of the Code.47 It should be remembered, however, that the
adoption of strict liability in tort is justified by the courts on strong
public policy grounds.
Article 2 of the Code is a complete, integrated body of statutory law
which was promulgated to regulate "transactions in goods" 48 and more
particularly "contracts for sale of goods."49 The definition of "goods"
in section 2-105 includes "all things which are moveable at the time
of identification.. 50 thus encompassing virtually all consumer prod-
ucts. Likewise, sections 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315 impose and define the
scope of seller's obligations as to the quality of the goods sold. Section
2-316, allows modification or exclusion of all warranties, including the
42. See Williston, supra note 37, at 374-80.
43. See Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code. 109
U. PA. L. REV. 401, 406-15 (1961), for cases leading to the development of section 2-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
44. UNIoRmi COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, -315, -316, -719.
45. See 1 CCH PROD. LIz. REP. 4060 (1968).
46. See note 3 supra.
47. See Shanker, supra note 7. See also Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability
Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 SrAN. L. REv. 974, 989-90,
992 (1966).
48. UurFoRm CoMMEcIAL CODE § 2-102.
49. Id. § 2-106(1).
50. Id. § 2-105(1).
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warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, if
specific requirements are met." Section 2-719 provides for contractual
modification or limitation of remedies by agreement of the parties unless
the modification or limitation should "fail of its essential purpose." 52
Section 2-719(3) allows limitation or exclusion of consequential dam-
ages if not found to be unconscionable, but a limitation in the case of
personal injuries is declared to be prima facie unconscionable.
While it is not clear whether section 2-302, dealing with unconscion-
able contracts, applies to section 2-316, the fact that the section might
be used to strike down an "unconscionable" disclaimer cannot be
doubted." Few decisions have utilized the unconscionability doctrine,s
and the majority of those that did fail to explain the working elements
of the doctrine.5 5 No court has as yet held that section 2-302 can be
used to strike down a 2-316 disclaimer56 and commentators are divided
on the question.5 7 Assuming that section 2-302 does apply to disclaimers,
the consumer has the burden of proving unconscionabiity, and to do
this he must have some notions as to what constitutes "unconscion-
ability." But the problem is that there is little case law,5 and therefore
the doctrine may be years in evolving on a case-by-case basis. During
this time period, the consumer will have no effective warranty protec-
tion if manufacturers and dealers of defective goods continue to effec-
tively disclaim all warranty liability under section 2-316. Some courts
apparently feel that the consumer who is injured by a defective prod-
uct should be protected under any circumstances and for this reason
are turning to strict liability in tort as an "alternative" remedy to the
Code. 9
51. Id. § 2-316(2).
52. Id. § 2-719(2).
53. See note 36 supra.
54. See Murray, supra note 36, at 50-72.
55. Id. See also, Leff, supra note 36, at 547-58.
56. See note 36 supra.
57. Id.
58. See Leff, supra note 36, at 547-58.
59. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, -, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 -l.Rptr.697, 701 (1962):
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based, on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to
the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between
them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreeiment but im-
posed by law.., and the refusal to permit the manufacturei to define -the
scope of its own responsibility for defective products. . . make clear that
[Vol. 1-2:895
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Strict liability developed from a desire to extend relief to consumers
not in privity with the manufacturer of defective products,0 but the
concept was quickly recognized as a convenient method for avoiding
the effect of disclaimer clauses in consumer contracts. Disclaimer clauses
in automobile sale contracts often designated "express warranties," were
the first to be "avoided" by the application of strict liability in tort.8 1
The Code declares the limitation of consequential damages for personal
injury to be prima facie unconscionable. Thus, when any warranty
is given, recovery for personal injury cannot be excluded." However,
it should be noted that recovery for personal injury can be prevented
simply by disclaiming all warranties. Limitation or exclusion of con-
sequential damages to property or for commercial loss is subject to sec-
tion 2-302's unconscionability provisions,63 but no case has as yet held
such a limitation or exclusion unconscionable. Recovery on the the-
ory of strict liability is not impeded by the presence of a disclaimer
clause because strict liability is a tort concept and accordingly is not
affected by contract defenses.64 Therefore a recovery for personal in-
juries and property damages on the theory of strict liability is permitted
in the face of an effective disclaimer.6 5 As previously stated, the results
reached under the tort theory can be justified on public policy grounds
in consideration of the consumer's needs and expectations. The editors
of the Uniform Commercial Code might determine to propose alter-
native amendments to the warranty, disclaimer and limitation of rem-
edies sections of the Code so as to attain the same results reached under
strict liability in tort.
THE UNDESIRABILITY OF THE DISCLAIMER OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY IN A SALE OF CONSUMER GooDs
In order to support the conclusion that the Code should offer amend-
the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by
the law of strict liability in tort.
60. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962).
61. E.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964). See generally Prosser, supra note 5. The automobile disclaimer has
'been subjected to much criticism and for good reason. See Note, supra note 7, at 356-58
wherein it is stated that Consumer's Union has 'eported a steady decline in automobile
quality since volume purchases and easy credit were introduced in the middle 1950's.
62. UNWioRMv COMMERCAL CODE § 2-719(3).
63. Id.
64. See note 3 supra.
65. E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145. 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
1971]
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ments to restrict the use of the disclaimer in the sale of consumer goods,
one must first determine whether or not a disclaimer of the implieo
warranty of merchantability in a consumer sale is undesirable because
it is in contravention of public policy. Because the majority of consumer
contracts are presently contracts of adhesion,", the consumer is forced
to assume the risk that the product may be defective on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. The consumer does not in fact bargain for disclaimer
terms because, individually, the consumer's bargaining power is ob-
viously inferior. The disclaimer terms, which are grounded on "free-
dom of contract" have become meaningless in the typical consumer
contract, and therefore it would perhaps be more accurate to designate
the transaction between merchant and consumer as something other
than a "contract." 67
As previously stated, for goods to be merchantable they must be fit
for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.s The implied
warranty of merchantability was created to protect buyers of defective
goods and its exclusion would seem to be a contradiction in terms unless
the "agreement" between the parties was truly the result of a bargained
for exchange.6" Section 2-302 of the Code was drafted to allow courts
to inquire into the bargaining process behind the adhesion contract, but
it is not clear that it applies to a valid 2-316 disclaimer.70 Even if it does
apply, the consumer has the burden of proving its "unconscionability." 71
Assume that the consumer, by some change in the market structure,
is able to bargain with an automobile dealer for a lower price due to
the inclusion in the contract for sale of a disclaimer of the implied
warranty of merchantability. Section 2-316 of the Code requires that
"subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention mer-
66. See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1943).
67. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Conswners and the Common Lawo
Tradition, 31 U. Pirr. L. REv. 349, 352 n.18 (1970). Professor Leff suggests calling the
transaction between consumer and merchant a "product" rather than a "contract."
68. UNIFORM COaMERcIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (c).
69. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 160: "Any general language of the disclaimer, no
matter how comprehensive it may be, is contradicted to some extent in such a case by
the description of the goods to be sold."
70. See note 36 supra.
71. UmFoRMv COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(2) states, "When it is claimed or appears
to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial
setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination."
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chantability and in the case of a writing must be conspicuous... ,
The reason for requiring the mention of the word "merchantability"
in section 2-316 is to "protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained
for language of disclaimer. . . . Does the mention of "merchant-
ability" actually disclose to the consumer the nature of the risks being
shifted to his side of the contract? It seems safe to assume that most
consumers do not fully appreciate the phrase "there is no implied war-
ranty of merchantability" because they do not normally know what
"merchantability" means.74 If the consumer is to be protected "from
unexpected and unbargained for language of disclaimer . . ." it would
seem necessary that he be familiar with the meaning of "implied war-
ranty of merchantability" and with the language necessary to effectively
disclaim this warranty. 75  If the consumer understands the nature of
the risks being shifted and agrees to accept them, then the disclaimer
should be given effect.
If manufacturers and dealers are prohibited from disclaiming the
implied warranty of merchantability in sales of consumer goods, the
manufacturing process will not cease76 unless the product is so defective
that comeptition is no longer feasible.77 Moreover, there is no good
reason to shift liability from the manufacturer of unmerchantable prod-
ucts to the consumer,78 who in terms of the effective distribution of
72. Id. § 2-316(2). See id. § 2-316(3):
Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty...."
73. Id. § 2-316, Comment 1.
74. See Franklin, supra note 47, at 980, 982 for a discussion of the word "defect"
and a possible misunderstanding of the difference between breach of warranty of
merchantability and that of fitness for a particular purpose in Seely v. White Motor
Co, 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). "[Defendant) would be liable
for business losses of other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to meet the
specific needs of their business... I" d. at 9, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22
(emphasis added).
75. If the disclaimer is to be effective, why not disclose its meaning as is being
done in other areas of consumer protection, e.g., "truth in lending."
76. "Nor indeed would the world, even the commercial world, come to an end if
parties were forbidden either to disclaim warranties or to withhold from each other
any of the total panoply of remedies for breach of contract which the Code provides."
Leff, supra note 36, at 516.
77. See Note, supra note 7, at 570-73.
78. See Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tenn. 1966).
1971]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
risk is least able to bear the loss. 9 By allowing the risk of loss to be
placed on the consumer, the Code is subsidizing manufacturers of de-
fective products and permitting such producers to compete with manu-
facturers of merchantable goods. 0 By prohibiting the use of disclaimer
clauses in consumer contracts the manufacturers of defective products
will be forced either to increase the price of their products to protect
themselves against damage recoveries and thereby lose their marketq'
or to increase the quality of their product8 In either event, the poten-
tial hazard to the consumer from defective products will be lessened.
A CHANCE FOR THE CODE
The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code
released Report No. 3 on December 15, 1966 setting forth "alternative
versions" A, B and C to section 2-318.83 The Board explained that it
had acted to "prevent further proliferation of separate variations from
state after state" 84 and so retain some semblance of uniformity. Alter-
native A makes no change in the present statutory language. Alterna-
tive B abolishes the requirement of vertical privity by adopting the
1950 draft of section 2-318, and alternative C was "drawn to reflect the
trend of more recent decisions as exemplified by Restatement of Torts
2d § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965)." 85 It has been argued that
since the state legislatures adopted the Uniform Commercial Code
intending thereby to pre-empt this area of the law the judicial recog-
nition of strict liability in tort is an infringement on legislative preroga-
tive. In a similar manner, it would seem that the reasons given by the
Permanent Editorial Board for promulgating alternatives A, B and C to
section 2-318, also support the adoption of alternative amendments to
sections 2-314, 2-316 and 2-719. The confusing theories resorted to by
some courts in sustaining strict liability in tort" are justified only by
79. See Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blwm and Kalven,
75 YALE L. J. 216, 225 (1965).
80. See Note, supra note 7, at 570-73.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. UCC REPORT No. 3, supra note 2.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. "A breach of warranty . . .is not only a violation of the sales contract out of
which the warranty arises, but is a tortious wrong... ." Goldberg v. Kollsman Instru-
ment Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 294 (1963). See
also U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244,
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the policy of consumer protection.8 7 Modification of the Code would
help reduce this lack of uniformity and also achieve the results now
reached under strict liability in tort.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO Tr UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 1-201
The following proposal could serve as an "optional" or "official"
amendment to section 1-201.
Add subsection (10.1) as follows:
(10.1) "Consumer goods" means any product intended for or cus-
tomarily used for personal, family, or household purposes.88
Section 2-314
The following proposals could serve as "optional" or "official" amend-
ments to section 2-314.
Alternative A: Retain the present wording.
Alternative B: Add subsection (4) as follows:
(4) Modification or exclusion of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.
Alternative C: Add subsection (4) as follows:
(4) A merchant may not exclude or limit the operation of this sec-
tion 'with respect to consumer goods.
COMMENT: Alternative A makes no change in the existing section
and if no change is made in section 2-316, the warranty of merchanta-
bility would still be subject to disclaimer.
257 NYE.2d 380 (1970) where the court held that if a plaintiff, suing for property
damage caused by breach of implied warranty of merchantability, is in privity with
defendant the four year Uniform Commercial Code statute of limitation applies, but
if there is no privity with defendant the two year statute of limitation for tort
actions applies. See Shanker, Pigeonholes, Privity, and Strict Products Liability, 21
CAn W. Ras. L. REv. 772 (1970).
87. Compare, Seely v. White Motor Co, 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965) with Santor v. A & M Karaghension, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
88. See Note, supra note 7, at 575.
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The purpose of alternatives B and C is to eliminate the possibility
of a disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability in the case
of consumer goods. From a practical standpoint, there is little that the
manufacturer or dealer can do to overcome the prima facie burden
imposed by alternative B.9 Few disclaimers, if any, will be upheld
because the consumer engages in very little bargaining before entering
into an "agreement," and at present courts do not favor disclaimers in
consumer salesY0 An additional cross-reference to section 2-302 would
be necessary to avoid confusion.
Alternative C eliminates disclaimers of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability in consumer sales and avoids the vagueness of the uncon-
scionability concept.set forth in section 2-302."' By avoiding section
2-302, the probability of greater uniformity is retained. No doubt,
alternative C embodies strict liability in tort, but the necessity of this
alternative is apparent when one considers that at least twenty jurisdic-
tions now recognize strict liability independent of the Code.
Section 2-316
The following proposals could serve as "optional" or "official" amend-
ments to section 2-316.
Alternative A: Retain the present wording.
Alternative B: Add subsection (5) as follows:
(5) Modification or exclusion of the implied ,warranty of merchant-
ability in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.
Alternative C: Add subsection (5) as follows:
(5) A merchant may not exclude or limit the implied 'warranty of
merchantability 'with respect to consumer goods.
COMMENTS: Alternatives A, B and C to section 2-316 are intended
to parallel alternatives A, B and C to section 2-314. Alternative A makes
no change in the existing section. The adoption of either alternative
would avoid possible confusion and make clear the legislative intent
89. See Franklin, supra note 47, at 1017.
90. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc, 32 NJ. 358, -, 161 A.2d 69, 95
(1960). See generally Note, supra note 32.
91. See generally Leff, supra note 36.
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to pre-empt the field. If alternative B is adopted, an additional cross-
reference to section 2-302 would be necessary.
Section 2-719
The following proposals could serve as "optional" or "official" amend-
ments to section 2-719.
Alternative A(1): Retain the present wording.
Alternative A(2): Reword subsection (3) to read as follows:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation or exclusion by
a merchant of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is not permitted under this section.
Alternative B (1): Reword subsection (3) to read as follows:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages by a merchant for injury to the person or property of the
buyer in the case of consumer goods is not permitted under this sec-
tion.
Alternative B (2): Reword subsection (3) to read as follows:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages by a merchant for injury to the person or
property of the buyer in the case of consumer goods is not permitted
under this section.
Alternative C(1): Reword subsection (3) to read as follows:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation or exclusion of
consequential damages by a merchant in the case of consumer goods
is prima facie unconscionable.
Alternative C(2): Reword subsection (3) to read as follows:
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation or exclusion of
1971]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
consequential damages by a merchant in the case of consumer goods
is not permitted under this section.
CoMvmENs: The expansion of warranty protection provided for in
alternatives B and C to section 2-314 and 2 316 would afford little pro-
tection to the consumer if the merchant-seller could limit or exclude
consequential damages under section 2-719(3). Presently under Code
Section 2-719 limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.
Alternative A(2) eliminates the limitation of consequential damages to
the person in case of consumer goods in unequivocal language and avoids
the use of "prima facie unconscionable," and therefore represents only
a small change to the present section. A cross-reference to section 2-302
is already a part of section 2-719.
Alternatives B(1) and B(2) are intended to prohibit the limitation
or exclusion of consequential damages to person and property by using
either the "prima facie unconscionable" or unequivocal language ap-
proach. Again, each alternative will provide approximately the. same
result.
Alternatives C(1) and C(2) eliminate the limitation or exclusion of
all consequential damages in sales of consumer goods by a merchant.
There is probably no reason to draw a distinction between commercial
loss, property damage and personal injury in consumer transactions;2
1500 dollars of commercial loss, property damage or personal injury
equals 1500 dollars of loss to the consumer. If one accepts the premise
that the merchant must stand behind his goods then the type of conse-
quential damage flowing from a breach of the warranty of merchant-
ability should not determine which party bears the loss.
Alternatives B(1) and B(2) create a problem by requiring that a
distinction be made between property damage and commercial loss.
The Code includes the term "commercial loss" in section 2-719 (3) which
sets forth the rules restricting limitation of consequential damages. But
section 2-715(2) (b) defines consequential damage in case of breach
of warranty as "injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty." The questions are now whether or not
1) "commercial loss" is included in "consequential damage" as the Code
seems to suggest, and 2) whether or not the term "commercial loss"
92. See Seely v. White Motors Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, -, 403 P.2d 145, 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
25 (1965) (Peters, J., dissenting).
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embodies any kinds of property damage. No attempt is made to dis-
tinguish between property damage and commercial loss under the Code.
This must be done only on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
The proposals set forth herein as alternatives to sections 2-314, 2-316
and 2-719(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code are intended as exam-
ples of the changes which the Permanent Editorial Board of the Code
should consider to prevent a usurpation of the warranty field by the
doctrine of strict liability in tort. The objective of proposing these
alternatives is the achievement of a uniform system of consumer war-
ranty protection similar to that now afforded by strict liability in tort.
The results now reached under the Code fail to reflect the grow-
ing trend in the consumer products liability area. Unless the Code is
changed to incorporate these new consumer trends, the law of products
liability will become the common law of torts.
WILLIAm M. MUSSER, III
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